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McCLELLAN THROUGH LINCOLN'S EYES DURING 1$62
One hundred years ago - 1$92 - this was General George B. McClellan's
big year militarily.
First, let's refresh our memory and set the stage.

In July of 1861

after the disastrous first battle of Bull Run, President Lincoln
summoned General McClellan to .Washington to command the Army of the
Potomac, and eventually to succeed the aging Winfield Scott as
commander of all the Union armies.

After much delay, McClellan

attempted to capture Richmond in a flanking move, only to be repulsed
by Lee at the Seven Days Battle.

Later in 1862, McClellan blocked

Lee's drive north at the bloody battle of Antietam.

Shortly after

this engagement McClellan was replaced, never again to be given a
field command during the war.
General McClellan's personality, ability, strategy and battlefield
maneuvers all have been discussed, disected, debated and rehashed in
literature and at Civil War Round Table sessions. But what of
President Abraham Lincoln's thoughts, opinions, evaluations and
feelings regarding his young tempermental commander?
At the beginning of 1862 the North was full of optimism for the Union
cause.

Everywhere, except in Virginia, victory seemed at hand. And

everyone believed the situation there was soon to change because
General McClellan was building the greatest army the world had ever
seen.

No one doubted that "Little Mac" would soon launch an over-

whelming offensive that would result in the capture of Richmond and
the crushing of the Confederacy.
As the winter of 1861-62 wore on, the North, particularly its
politicians, became impatient and demanded action.

The pressures

grew on McClellan and the cries of "On to Richmond" got louder
and louder .

Newspaper editorials needled him .

14cGlella n r eacted

to these barbs with outraged pride and growing bitterness .

Lincoln

nevertheless had confidence in McClellan and tried without much
success to explain to the Ge neral that politicians were a necessary
evil that must be tolerated .

McCl ellan however blamed the President

for much of his troubles and often was haughty and insulting to
Lincoln .
The President let McClellan ' s slights and bursts of temperament roll
off his back , saying one time to irate friends "I will hol d General
McClellan ' s horse if he will only bring us victory ."
As time passed , the President himself finally became impatient with
McClellan ' s lack of action .

Lincoln favored an attack on Manassas

followed by a drive south to Richmond .
"t

McClellan had a plan of

attack by land and water , moving toward Richmond by a flanking attack
up the peninsular between the James and York Rivers.

The General

and his President consumed more time arguing the merits of the respective plans.
Finally an exasperated Lincoln issued his famous general war order
No . 1, ordering all land and naval forces to move on the Confederacy
on the 22nd of February , 1862 .

Lincoln no doubt did not expect the

order to be taken too seriously as a program of action. He issued it

r

primarily to compel McClellan and other commanders to move against
the enemy.
But McCl ellan continued to bicker with the President over his plan of
attack and that of the President's .

Lincoln finally wrote to

McClellan , stating that if the General could answer five questions to
his satisfaction he would yield to McClellan ' s plan of attack.
-2-

The questions were:
Does your plan involve a larger expenditure of time and money
than mine?
Wherein is a victory more certain by your plan than mine?
Wherein is a victory more valuable by your plan than mine?
Would it not be less valuable in that yours would not
break a great line of enemy ' s communication while mine would?
In case of disaster would it not be more difficult to retreat
by your plan than mine?
These were posers for McClellan but he answered them thoroughly and
directly .

His frankness surprised and pleased Lincoln, and although

the President was not yet "sold 11 he approved McClellan ' s plan. The
General wrote Lincoln his appreciation for Lincoln ' s confidence, but
he had much less of the President ' s confidence than he thought. For
the moment, the President, probably out of his deference to McClellan's
supposed better judgment, kept his misgivings to himself.
During February and March of 1862 McClellan went about with his preparations for the peninsular campaign .
objections to the campaign plan .

Then Lincoln again raised

McClellan suggested submitting the

plan to a council of commanders of his army divisions for their decision. This idea appealed to Lincoln, because if the general approved
it the plan must be all right .

The generals voted 8 to 4 for the

McClellan plan .
Lincoln accepted the verdict and again against his better judgment
yielded to McClellan and accepted an attack plan he considered risky.
Seeds of doubt about McClellan ' s ability now had become planted in
Lincoln ' s mind. Relations between the President and his oornmander
became strained.

,r--

Lincoln issued two orders reorganizing the army

without even consulting McClellan,and adding conditions to McClellan ' s

--3--

plan.
On March 11, 1862, Lincoln suddenly relieved McClellan as General in
Chief, leaving him in command only of the Department of the Potomac.
Lincoln , however, had excellent military reasons for stripping
McClellan of supreme command. With the general about to lead l.he Army
of the Potomac personally into an overall campaign, it was obvious
that he could not exercise an overall supervision of operations in
other theaters .

The field command of his own army would be all he

could handle. It has been said that Lincoln had intended to restore
McClellan to supreme command if he captured Richmond .
McClellan reacted to the President's order by writing to Lincoln he
was ready to serve in any capacity and woul d let no consideration of
self interfere with his work.

Lincoln was pleased with the tone of

McClellan' s letter and his attitude softened .
McClellan meanwhile was moving his forces to the James and York Rivers.
Then a ruckus developed over the adequacy of troops McClellan was
planning to leave to protect the capital city.
was accused of disloyalty and even treason.

As a result , McClellan

Because McClellan was a

Democrat, there were those who accused the General of a plot. to leave
Washington defenseless so it would be captured by the Confederates.
Lincoln did not believe this accusation and defended his General but
conceded McClellan had acted unwisely.
Lincoln took it upon himself to order several troops about to embark to
remain to defend Washington.

McClellan protested bitterly,claiming

he was facing superior numbers and needed every man he could get.
Lincoln replied curtly that McClellan had over 100,000 troops and that he
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ought to break the ConfederaLe lines at once . McClellan was enraged
and reported in correspondence he was tempted to tell Lincoln to come
direct the battle himself.
In penetrating criticism , the President told friends he had taken
McClell an ' s measure ; the General, he said , had talent and was great
at preparation , but he lacked aggressiveness and became nervous and
oppressed as the hour for action approached.
In April of 1862 McClellan began troop movements toward Richmond . The
battle of Shiloh had been fought in the west ; the country and Lincoln
had been waiting impatiently for McClellan to launch an offensive .
Finally Lincoln sent McClellan the following communication : "And once more let me tell you it is indispensable to
you that you strike a blow •• • I beg to assure you that
I have never written you or spoken to you in greater
kindness of feeling than now, nor with a fuller purpose
to sustain you, so far as in my most anxious judgment
I consistently can ; but , you must act."
Another month passed before McClellan really came to grips with the
Confederate army.

As the fighting progressed, Lincoln sent notes of

encouragement. "Stand well on your guard 11 said one,

11

hold all your

ground, or yield only inch by inch and in good order."
As the going got rough, McClellan continued to beg for reinforcements ,
his reqµests becoming more insulting in tone. Lincoln was not
offended , thinking McClellan had written them in moments of stress
and had not meant all he had said . Instead of rebuking the general
he wrote him a kindly and encouraging letter. Lincoln must have felt
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a deep sympathy for the young Ge110.ral so oppressed by responsibili ty ,
for he closed his letter with a characteristically humble Lincolnian
sentence , "I believe I would come and see you were it not that 1 fear
my presence might divert you and the army from more important matters ."
On another occasion, however , when McClellan complained that rainy
weather was hampering his operation Lincoln curtly commenLed
and mud does not appear to bog down Lee .

11

'I'he rain

General McCl ellan seems to

think, in defiance of the scripture , that heaven sent its rain only on
the just and not on the unjust . 11
Lincoln was bitterly disappointed at the defeat of McCl ellan ' s army
on the peninsular and he went personally to visit the General to see
for himself the condition of the troops . It was here that McClellan
gave Lincoln a long letter telling Lincoln in effect how to run the
government, which the President read over but did not respond to .
Lincoln had already decided to evacuate the pennisular and to remove
McClellan ' s troops to Northern Virginia.
Lincoln ordered McClellan to join General John Pope who , in command of
a new army , was advancing on Manassas . ln typical fashion McClellan
delayed , offering one excuse after another .

In one conversation

McClellan was reported to have said something about leaving " Pope
to get out of his scrape . "

Lincoln was shocked when he heard what

McClellan was alleged to have said .
Pope did not get out of his "scrape " and was soundly beaten at the

r

second battle of Bull Run . Lincoln called in 1~cClellan and demanded
to know if he and his officers had betrayed Pope . McClellan claimed
the report was false and that whate ver he and his officers thought of

I

'
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Pope they would support him. McClellan reported later that Lincoln
was "deeply moved. 11

There are those, however, who feel that the

President's emotion was probably suppressed anger. McClellan then
sent a letter to his officers requesting fullest cooperation with Pope.
Lincoln intended to give McClellan the command of all the troops in
and around \·:a shington but he wanted to be sure first McClellan had
not betrayed Pope.

McClellan's letter to his ·officers satisfied

Lincoln for the moment.
The President went ahead and placed McClellan in command of troops in
the Capital area although most of his cabinet members opposed the move.
In answer to their protests, Lincoln said he felt he had done what
was best, that McClellan was a good organizer who could whip the
troops into shape for the defense of Washington better than anyone
else. The Cabinet did not seem to be convinced and Lincoln was disturbed.

He insisted that all McClellan was to do was to put the

troops into the fortifications and command them if the enemy attacked
the city.

No field command was being given McClellan, he emphasized.

McClellan had the confidence of the Army, said Lincoln, and he
intended to use McClellan's strength with the soldiers temporarily
until the army could be reorganized.
Lincoln appeared determined that McClellan's command should only be
temporary because he had decided the general was incapable of

r

offensive warfare, which was what he wanted ultimately from the Army
of the Potomac, and also because he still was not convinced McClellan
and his officers had supported Pope properly. Meanwhile, Lincoln's
anger increased as he heard more evidence of McClellan's course of
action during Pope's engagement with Lee.
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'l'he President tol d his secre Lary ..1ohn Hay "He has acted badly in this
matter , but we must., use what tools we have .

r"'.

There is no man in the

Army who can man these fortifications and lick Lhese Lroops of ours inLo
shape as well as he .

If he can ' t, fight himsell', he excels in makin~

others ready to fight. ."
McClellan would have been shocked and unbelieving if he had known what
Lincoln was saying about him and why the President had appointed him to
his command. "Little Mac " assumed he had been called upon because he
was the only man who could save the country.
Lincoln ' s plan to use McClellan in a temporary capacity to reorganize
the army and train troops for active operations under another commander
depended , however , on the Confederates remaining inactive during this
period. But Lee abruptl y upset Lincoln ' s plans when early in September
the Confederate Commander led his troops across the Potomac and invaded
western Maryland .

Obviously the Army of the Potomac had to move ag ainst

Lee, and at Lhe very least repel the invasion.
But who should command the army in this important campaign . Lincoln did
not think McClellan should . He offered command to General Burnside who
refused it . The only alternative readily available with field command
experience was McClellan and it was a bitter one for the President., .
So McClellan again was given the field command .
The Union Commander moved to meet Lee , whose army was scattered , but as

r

McClellan approached , the Confederate Commander began to consolidate
his forces . McClellan mistook the sight of retreating Confederates as
an indication of victory and he sent exulting communications to Lincoln .
" God Bless you and all with you , " a delighted President responded .
" Destroy the rebel Army if possible . "
__$ _ _

After the bloody engagement at Antietam Creek, Lee withdrew his troops
and started back for Virginia. McClellan informed Lincoln that his
victory was complete. The word "complete 11 meant to Lincoln that the
Confederate Army was badly smashed up and that its existence would be
ended when McClellan followed up his victory with a mop-up operation.
The President happily announced the victory at Antietam to the members
of his Cabinet saying "I rejoice in this success for many public reasons,
but I am happy on account of McClellan." The President naturally concluded that McClellan would follow up such a victory as he had reported
with an attack on the remnants of Lee ' s Army that would end the war in
the east.
But Lee escaped to Virginia and a disappointed Lincoln set to work
trying again to get McClellan to invade Virginia. As at the peninsula,

i-:

McClellan delayed and made excuses. Many of his dispatches referred to
the inadequate number and poor quality of his cavalry animals,
Lincoln's patience collapsed and in an acid lelegram he said "I have
just read your dispatches about sore-tongued and fatigued horses.
Will you pardon me for asking what the horses of your army have done
since the battle of Antietam that fatigues anything?"
One of the President's secretaries noted that the President was getting
increasingly critical of McClellan. As the secretary reported it,
Lincoln kept poking sharp sticks under McClellan's ribs. On one occasion
he referred to the Army of the Potomac as

11

McClellan's Bodyguard."

The President obviously had passed the point where he would accept any
further excuse for delay.
McClellan meanwhile moved south slowly and centered his army around
(:,

Warrenton,Virginia.

I
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The night of November 7, 1862 a s pecial courier from Washington arrived
in camp with an order from President Lincoln relieving McClel lan of
his command. McClellan's war career was finished ; never again would .he
receive another assignment to duty .
Lincoln told many people why he removed McClellan. One word dominated
everything he said about the general - SLOW. He had been too slow in
getting to the field of Antietam, he had been too slow after Antietam,
and he had been too slow crossing the Potomac t
When it took McClellan several days to cross a river that Lee had
crossed in one , Lincoln said he decided McClellan would never catch
the Confederates , and would never get to Richmond. He has got the
11

slows 11 he said .

The President relieved McClellan out of a sense of duty to the country ,
it
but he did with some reluctance and a little pain . He considered
McClellan to be a good soldier in some respects and he liked the
general personally .

11

He is an admirable engineer , " Lincoln was supposed

to have said of McClellan

11

but he seems to have a special talent for a

stationary engine ."
McClellan was not a fighting man. In Lincoln ' s mind McClellan stood
for strategy, preparation , delay and , at best , Larren victories .
Hard , tough fighting would win the war , not strategy , Lincoln said.
The Army must be officered by fighting men. The President had decided
the country could no longer afford a General like McClellan .

\
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